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The 2011 NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement: Intentions vs. Incentives  
 
The summer before the 2011 NFL season, the NFL engaged in one of the most 
bitter labor negotiations in its recent history. Players, owners, and league officials fought 
tooth and nail to make their priorities NFL law through their inclusion in the Collective 
Bargaining Agreement. News coverage swirled over the reactions of players to the 
potential of a lost season, questions over what was changing in the agreement, and 
primarily, why the negotiations were taking so long. Soon, conversation turned to 
whether there would be a need for replacement players, as was the case in 1987, or for a 
shortened season, as was the case in 1982.  
This thesis will examine the 2011 NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) 
with the benefit of hindsight, analyzing the key features of the 2011 CBA, their intended 
consequences, and their actual impact on the league and its players. It will also serve to 
forecast if/how these issues might come into play in the 2021 CBA for relevant issues. 
The issues of primary concern for the 2011 CBA were the distribution of league revenues 
between the players and the owners, the distribution of team spending on rookies versus 
veterans, player safety, and commissioner powers. In this negotiation, veteran players 
sought to augment their revenue streams by addressing the first two issues, and protect 
themselves through the second two. Unfortunately, the impacts of the policies that 
players implemented had, by in large, the opposite of the anticipated effect, harming the 
players at almost every turn. By creating a rookie pay scale and increasing veteran 
minimums, veterans may have made themselves more easily substitutable for rookies, 
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and by limiting the amount of practice time in the offseason, players may have increased 
the prevalence of conditioning related injuries. 
After providing some context on the 2011 CBA, I will take a deeper look at the 
key takeaways. The context section will provide the reader with an understanding of how 
collective bargaining has taken place during previous agreements, and the general 
bargaining process, as well as what the intentions of CBAs generally are. Furthermore, 
this section will provide the reader with the background knowledge required to 
understand the issues of the salary cap, rookie pay scale and veteran minimums, player 
safety concerns, and the relationship between the players and the league. This will help 
clarify some of the more complicated issues in the body of the paper, in addition to 
allowing the reader to focus on the analysis and the current issues facing NFL players as 
a result of the 2011 agreement.  
In order to do this, the body of the paper will analyze how the NFLPA used 
changes in the salary cap and salary minimums as a bargaining chip, the tradeoffs that 
occurred in the establishment of the current rookie wage scale and veteran minimum 
systems, the impact of practice time on the prevalence of player injuries since the signing 
of the current CBA, and how Commissioner Roger Goodell’s use of disciplinary powers 
has impacted current players’ perceptions of the league. Ultimately, it is clear that the 
NFLPA failed its constituents in many of the key negotiating areas in the CBA. Within 
the benefit of reflection, it would appear as though the upcoming 2021 negotiations will 
be accompanied by a holdout, which could even stretch into the NFL regular season. 
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Section I - Background: 
A) CBAs Generally and the Bargaining Process: 
 Before diving into background on the 2011 CBA, context on previous NFL 
Collective Bargaining Agreements is crucial. In the NFL, the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement is the terms to which the NFL Players Association (NFLPA) and the owners 
of the 32 NFL teams agree to run the league under for a set period of time. This includes 
items ranging from the payment of rookies and the total salary cap for each season to the 
disciplinary power held by the commissioner and the NFL’s drug policy for performance 
enhancing drugs (PEDs) and marijuana, and everything between. Thus, during 
negotiations, both sides are very defensive of the gains that they have made and 
aggressive in trying to bargain for things that they feel that they deserve. The CBA in 
football is often viewed as unique because of the violent nature of the sport that leaves 
former players especially vulnerable once their primary revenue stream has dried up and 
they begin experiencing the negative physical and mental effects of their time spent in the 
NFL. Thus, considerations for retirees and veteran players are often highly deliberated 
and were one of the focuses of the 2011 CBA. 
 The NFLPA has used CBAs throughout the majority of the Super Bowl Era to 
bargain for higher wages and as a mechanism to collectively strike. The Super Bowl Era 
describes the modern NFL, which combined with the rival league the AFL (American 
Football League) and began awarding the Super Bowl Trophy rather than the NFL 
Championship Trophy. The first CBA was struck in 1968, before the third season of the 
Super Bowl Era, when players tried to pressure the owners into providing better 
compensation and benefits. This led to the first NFL lockout.  
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A lockout is when owners do not allow players to participate in team activities, 
and is the mechanism that NFL owners use to make players follow their direction. A 
similar term, holdout, is essentially a lockout run by the players, where players do not 
report to mandatory NFL training until there is a satisfactory agreement reached. In the 
case of a lockout, owners do not pay their players because they are not allowed in the 
facility, while in a holdout the players do not report to team activities and therefore they 
chose to forgo their wage in order to negotiate for better compensation. This first lockout 
lasted only 11 days before the owners and players agreed to terms.1 This is generally the 
same process that other CBA negotiations gone south have followed, with varying 
lengths of lockouts/holdouts stretching from a few days to multiple months. These can be 
ended amicably through good faith negotiations and bargaining, or more aggressively 
through litigation and strikes that sometimes impact the season.  
 The negotiation process for CBAs is often complicated, confusing, and fairly 
counterintuitive to the players, let alone for an outside observer. Thus, this paper will 
provide a general overview of the bargaining process, providing the steps that took place 
in the 2011 negotiations, some of which will likely also occur during the 2021 
negotiations. One wrinkle particular to the 2011 CBA was the opt-out by the owners from 
the 2006 CBA. This will be discussed further in the next section, but was a key part of the 
2011 CBA negotiation process that could not be left out. The 2011 CBA did not include 
an opt-out clause, which would allow one or both sides to back out of the agreement after 
																																																								
1 Michael Schottey, "How Free Agency Changed the NFL Forever," Bleacher Report, 
https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1561856-how-free-agency-changed-the-nfl-forever. 
2 Adam Stites, "NFLPA Is Warning Players to Start Saving Money Now for a 2021 
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a certain amount of time, for the NFL owners nor the NFL Players Association after the 
controversy that arose from its use to end the 2006 CBA.  
 In 2011, the CBA negotiation process began with federal mediation.2 This is fairly 
typical of negotiations around the CBA as well as for other negotiations between the 
players and the league since both want the input of a neutral arbiter. Despite mediation, 
little progress resulted, leading to a weeklong extension of the 2006 CBA and the 
continuation of negotiations between the NFL and NFLPA for a new CBA3. After a few 
weeks of bargaining, once it was clear that the distance between the sides was 
insurmountable, the NFLPA decertified as a union in order to file an anti-trust lawsuit.4 
This is a common and intuitive practice for sports unions given anti-trust law and the 
monopoly power that a sports league has over the livelihood of its players. It also gave 
the players the legal clout that they were previously lacking as a certified union.  
Historically, NFL owners have had significantly more power than individual 
players, and typically more influence than even a large number of players. The creation 
of a CBA was meant to solve this, but during the time between when the owners opted 
out of the 2006 CBA and a new one was implemented, the players were in very 
precarious position. Decertifying as a union gave the players the right to litigate 
separately against the NFL, thus providing much more support for the case. After a series 
of back and forth appeals, the granting of both temporary and permanent stays to lift the 
lockout (which were reversed and re-reversed), and a variety of other legal issues, the 
																																																								
2 Adam Stites, "NFLPA Is Warning Players to Start Saving Money Now for a 2021 
Lockout," https://www.sbnation.com/2017/5/30/15712404/nflpa-cba-nfl-lockout-2021-
leverage-negotiations. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
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NFL and players continued to negotiate, mostly behind closed doors, in order to move 
closer toward a new CBA.5 After frantic discussions between the NFL and the NFLPA in 
order to avoid impacting the regular season, the new CBA was voted on and agreed to by 
the players and owners on July 25th, 2011.  
 This brief account should give context as to some complications that can arise in 
CBA negotiations in general, as well as what specifically occurred during the 2011 CBA 
negotiations. Since players were unaware that there would be a lockout because owners 
opted out of the 2006 CBA prematurely, they were unable to appropriately plan 
financially. This put the owners in the driver’s seat of the negotiations, since the skill of 
an NFL player is very difficult to translate to outside of football, whereas the owners 
have outside revenue streams and thus were not cripplingly financially impacted by the 
holdout. The 2011 CBA negotiation is known as one of the most hard fought and 
complex negotiations to occur in NFL CBA history. There were a variety of 
complications that were unique to the 2011 CBA negotiation given the context of the 
league and society as a whole at the time, just as there likely will be for the 2021 CBA 
negotiation. In order to fully understand the context of the 2011 CBA, it is crucial to 
understand the circumstances that led to the negotiations. The next section will provide 
some context first in regards to the 2006 CBA, and later with respect to some cultural 
issues that were prevalent at the time that influenced the 2011 CBA. 
 
B) Ghosts of CBAs Past and NFL Free Agency: 
																																																								
5 Ibid. 
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 The 2006 CBA is one of the shortest lived in NFL history and kicked off the 2011 
CBA negotiations that ultimately ended up being one of the longest negotiating processes 
in NFL history. CBAs tend to have a fixed length (the length of the 2011 CBA is 10 
years) but, as in the case of the 2006 CBA, they sometimes include an opt-out clause for 
one or both sides of the agreement. In 2006 there was an opt-out for both sides, which the 
NFL owners utilized in 2008.6 For the 2011 CBA there was a two-way opt-out clause 
discussed, but it was ultimately scrapped in favor of a uniform, 10-year CBA length.7 The 
2006 CBA was actually an extension of the CBA that was initially agreed to in 1993.8 
This CBA had been extended to 2006 through a multitude of other small extensions 
similar to the 2006 CBA. With each extension there were minor adjustments, but the 
main substance of the CBA remained consistent.  
The 1993 CBA kicked off what has since been deemed the “Free Agency era”. 
This is because it allowed players whose contract had expired to explore their options 
with every team in the league by fielding contract offers from any team. This process is 
known as unrestricted free agency, giving the players the freedom to decide on what team 
they want to go to based on whatever criteria they decide. This was staunchly different 
from the system prior to the 1993 CBA, which had free agency, but it was severely 
																																																								
6 Ben Volin, "NFL Owners Destroyed the Players in CBA Negotiations," 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/2013/07/20/nfl-owners-destroyed-players-cba-
negotiations/ia3c1ydpS16H5FhFEiviHP/story.html. 
7 Gregg Rosenthal, "Final Answer: No Opt Out Clause in CBA," 
https://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/25/final-answer-no-opt-out-clause-in-cba/. 
 
8 "NFL Labor History Since 1968," 
http://www.espn.com/nfl/news/story?page=nfl_labor_history. 
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restricted. The earlier system gave teams the right to “protect 37 percent of their 
players… with the right of first refusal”, which was known as restricted free agency.9   
Unrestricted free agency fundamentally changed the sport and the philosophy of 
team building. It allowed General Mangers (the person generally tasked with adding and 
jettisoning players) more freedom to make up for bad drafting by adding proven veteran 
talent. It also places a finite timeline on teams and players attempting to negotiate a deal, 
since they can also negotiate with other teams. Additionally, unrestricted free agency 
places a higher value on drafting every year, creating a system where teams are only 
guaranteed to have the players that they drafted for the duration of their first contract. 
While that can be helpful for a team in the case of a draft pick that does not work out, it 
can be potentially disastrous for teams that have many young players that are looking for 
second contracts while the team does not have the financial flexibility to retain them all. 
 While free agency was a bit of a mixed bag from the perspective of NFL teams 
and owners, it was a distinct win for the NFLPA and the players. Free agency gives 
players the opportunity to leave a team once their contract is up without having to worry 
about their former team controlling their negotiating rights. It also allows players to test 
their value on the open market and take the best deal for them. Instead of only knowing 
the value that the team who drafted them places on the player, free agency allows players 
to negotiate with any team in the NFL and maximize their earnings potential. While 
positional needs and salary cap restrictions reduce this from thirty-two teams, it still gives 
players a much larger market for their services than they had previously enjoyed. This 
allows players more freedom in the location where they play, coaches that they play for, 
																																																								
9 Schottey, "How Free Agency Changed the NFL Forever." 
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schemes that they want to play in, etc. Free agency is especially closely tied with the 
salary cap. In tandem with the establishment of free agency in 1993, the NFL also 
introduced the salary cap, which essentially served as the owners guarantee that free 
agency would not create an uncapped bidding war between teams. 
 The NFL, in contrast to some other sports leagues around the world, utilizes a 
salary cap on its teams to ensure parity between teams. One of the calling cards of the 
NFL is the mantra “any given Sunday”, implying that any team could beat any other team 
in any given game, or on “any given Sunday” since games are traditionally played on 
Sundays. The salary cap is a key aspect of this because it provides a limit to the amount 
that any team can spend on its players in a year. The negotiations on the level of the 
salary cap are incredibly complex and require intimate knowledge of the NFL’s revenue 
streams such as TV deals and merchandise sales. In the 2006 CBA negotiations, the NFL 
and NFLPA agreed on about a sixty-forty revenue split, exempting some revenue streams 
from the equation all together to appease the wishes of owners concerned with their 
bottom line. The revenue of the NFL just over ten years ago was dramatically smaller 
than it is today given the ability of the current Commissioner of the NFL, Roger Goodell 
to maximize league profits. At the time of the 2006 CBA negotiation, however, the 
revenues were much smaller, so the sixty percent figure that was allocated to players was 
nowhere near the level that it is today at a smaller percentage ($102 million in 2006 
versus $177 million today).10 The CBA gives guidelines for teams about how much of the 
salary cap they have to spend (to incentivize teams not to collude and drive player 
																																																								
10 "NFL Communications - Year-by-Year Salary Cap," NFL, 
https://nfllabor.wordpress.com/2010/02/24/year-by-year-salary-cap/. 
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salaries down), the amount of the unspent cap that is carried over year-to-year, and other 
more intricate details.  
The primary issue for owners in the 2006 CBA negotiation was revenue sharing 
between owners of big market teams, like the Dallas Cowboys, and small market teams, 
like the Cincinnati Bengals. The infighting that resulted allowed the players to seize the 
opportunity to maximize their revenue allocation, which is how they were able to secure 
sixty percent of league revenues. However, once the 2006 CBA had been implemented 
and the owners had accepted the new revenue sharing model among themselves, they 
decided to use the opt-out clause. This was partially in order to reduce the percentage of 
revenues shared with players, especially because of the large new TV contracts that they 
knew were to be negotiated in the coming years. Thus, one of the key issues for the 
owners in the 2011 CBA negotiations was revenue sharing between the players and the 
owners, which will be explored in more depth later in the analysis section of the paper. 
In 2010, due to the use of the opt-out clause by the owners and the inability for 
the owners and NFLPA to reach an agreement on a new CBA, the league experienced its 
first “uncapped” year since the implementation of the salary cap in 1993.11 Thus, teams 
were free to spend as much or as little as they desired. While most teams chose to 
generally follow the salary cap progression from prior years, two teams participated fully 
in the spirit of the uncapped year, spending money and frontloading contracts in order to 
take advantage of the temporary removal of the salary cap. The league penalized both 
teams, the Dallas Cowboys and the Washington Redskins, in 2012 and 2013 with a 
reduction in their salary cap because it deemed that they had inappropriately frontloaded 																																																								
11 John Perritano, "How Does the NFL Salary Cap Work?," HowStuffWorks, 
https://entertainment.howstuffworks.com/question644.htm. 
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contracts in 2010, which ultimately disrupted the competitive balance of the league.12 
There have been allegations of collusion by the owners to drive player salaries down 
during 2010 in order to keep the payroll of every team regulated, but this has not been 
proven. The uncapped year is not directly relevant to the 2011 CBA, but does serve to 
provide some league context for the negotiations and the gulf between the players and 
owners. Furthermore, understanding the uncapped year provides a greater familiarity with 
the benefits of the salary cap for owners and how it regulates league parity. 
The two most recent CBAs serve to provide a significant amount of league 
context for the 2011 CBA negotiations. While many earlier negotiations had been 
smoother between the NFL and the NFLPA, when Goodell became Commissioner in 
September of 2006, tensions between the NFL and the players rose as he exerted more of 
his influence on the league. Once the 2011 negotiations arrived, the two sides were so far 
apart that a lockout seemed almost inevitable. However, because this type of hostility had 
not occurred in recent CBA negotiations, players were financially unprepared. 
 
C) The Policies that Broke the Players’ Trust and the State of Player Preparation 
 After being selected as the incoming Commissioner of the NFL just before the 
2006 season, Roger Goodell inherited an NFL with many areas for improvement, from 
league discipline to player safety. One place that he took especially seriously was in how 
players conducted themselves off the field. This emphasis lead to the release of a 
Personal Conduct Policy in 2007 that held players more strongly accountable for their 																																																								
12 Judy Battista, "NFL Strips Cowboys and Redskins of Salary Cap Room," The New 
York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/13/sports/football/nfl-strips-cowboys-
and-redskins-of-salary-cap-room.html. 
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actions and recognized the role that NFL players hold in our national culture.13 Goodell’s 
policy was in response to multiple players being arrested repeatedly during the offseason, 
committing crimes often with limited legal repercussions. A phrase at the beginning of 
the policy soon became emblematic of its goal: “As an employee of the NFL or a member 
club, you are held to a higher standard and expected to conduct yourself in a way that is 
responsible, promotes the values upon which the league is based, and is lawful”.14 This 
means that players could be reprimanded by the league for personal conduct violations 
regardless of how their actions were viewed by the justice system.  
The policy immediately went into effect on a few players, leading to the 
imposition of a season long suspension for Adam “Pacman” Jones and a half season 
suspension each for Chris Henry and Terry “Tank” Johnson. Jones was accused of battery 
and felony coercion, Henry was accused of aggravated assault with a firearm, and 
Johnson was accused of unlawful possession of a firearm.1516 
 While the policy was initially popular with the NFL Player’s Association, 
garnering words of support from the NFLPA President at the time Gene Upshaw, it 
quickly soured in the view of the players as Goodell began exerting his influence beyond 
where the players felt appropriate.17 Not only were these suspensions more plentiful than 
																																																								
13 Brent Jones, "Goodell Strengthens NFL Personal Conduct Policy," USA Today, 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2007-04-10-new-conduct-
policy_N.htm?csp=34. 
14 Mark Alesia, "NFL Personal Conduct Policy," 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1102477-nfl-personal-conduct-policy.html. 
15 Jarrett Bell, “Conduct Unbecoming: NFL Sets New Standard With Suspensions,” 
 USA Today, https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2007-04-10-pacman-
henry-suspensions_N.htm. 
16 Len Pasquarelli, "Bears Decide to Move On, Waive Tank Johnson," ESPN, 
http://www.espn.com/nfl/news/story?id=2916083. 
17 Jones, "Goodell Strengthens NFL Personal Conduct Policy." 
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in previous years, Goodell seemed to kick-start an era of increasing accountability in the 
NFL as high profile players were brought into the national spotlight and significantly 
reprimanded.  
In order to incentivize teams to buy into the disciplinary process, Goodell also 
sought to hold teams accountable for the actions of their players.18 The policy applied to 
players and coaches, as well as other team employees, owners, and officials, providing a 
standard set of behavioral norms for everyone involved in the NFL, but applying these 
conditions to many that had not had their conduct regulated by the NFL before.19 This 
laid the groundwork for a relationship between Goodell and the owners that has had 
many peaks and valleys throughout his tenure. The fact that the Personal Conduct Policy 
applied to everyone involved in the NFL was notable because of how the policy was 
employed. Action through the policy was not a result of a conviction through the justice 
department. This was a deviation from the past that caused much consternation in the 
case of “Pacman” Jones, who was the first player to be penalized by this new system to 
its fullest extent. He received a season-long suspension despite the fact that he was not 
convicted of a crime by a court of law. Initially supported for the stand that the policy 
represented with respect to player accountability, players and fans soon became confused 
by the new standard of proof required for investigation and penalization by the NFL. 
 Over time players became more and more frustrated with the Personal Conduct 
Policy, primarily because of its arbitrariness. This encompassed not only confusion with 
the standard of proof, but also the process by which they were investigated. Under the 																																																								
18 Barry Wilner, "Goodell Strengthens NFL Conduct Policy," The Washington Post, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/04/10/AR2007041001050.html. 
19 Alesia, "NFL Personal Conduct Policy." 
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Personal Conduct Policy, the league conducted its own investigations, called witnesses, 
and determined its own punishments completely independent from the law of the land. 
However, players took significant issue with a specific line in the policy, “Upon 
conclusion of the investigation, the Commissioner will have full authority to impose 
discipline as warranted”.20 While originally unnoticed, this clause gave Goodell power 
that surpassed any of his predecessors and allowed him to have the final say over all 
personal conduct policy issues for players, coaches, and owners. 
 As mentioned above, this policy immediately led to some of the most prominent 
names in the sport being held under the microscope. In addition to those listed above, this 
included one of the most exciting quarterbacks of the last quarter-century Michael Vick, 
and two-time Super Bowl champion quarterback Ben Roethlisberger. However, arguably 
the most prominent punishment Goodell handed out in his early years was the 
punishment to the New England Patriots for what has been termed “Spygate”. This was 
an incident in which the New England Patriots were accused of taping the practices of the 
New York Jets before their game in September of 2007 and stealing their sideline signals. 
Following an internal investigation by the NFL, the Patriots were forced to forfeit their 
first round draft pick, pay a fine of $250,000, and the head coach was also fined the 
maximum amount of $500,000.21 This was especially significant because it was enforced 
against the Patriots, with whom Goodell was thought to have had a particular strong 
relationship, specifically with the owner Robert Kraft. Furthermore, the Patriots were led 
																																																								
20 Ibid. 
21 "NFL Fines Belichick, Strips Patriots of Draft Pick," NFL.com History, 
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d80251b7e/article/nfl-fines-belichick-strips-
patriots-of-draft-pick. 
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by one of the greatest quarterbacks and coaches in the NFL, in the midst of a dynasty 
never before seen in the modern NFL. This was not the last time that Goodell would butt 
heads with Belichick and the Patriots. 
 Goodell clearly amassed a significant amount of ill will during his first few years 
as Commissioner, leading to very tense conversations surrounding the CBA as 
negotiations grew nearer. Not only did Goodell alienate some players through his 
enforcement of the Personal Conduct Policy, but he also confronted coaches and owners 
that had previously seemed untouchable. Given the tension between Goodell and the 
players, there was clearly the potential for players to hold out of the season, but 
unfortunately they did not successfully prepare financially. Many highly paid players in 
the league were forced to take high interest loans as a result of their loss in compensation 
from the holdout.22 Because the players had not successfully saved and had a certain 
lifestyle expectation, some were taken advantage of by these high interest loans that led 
to huge issues when their playing careers were over. In an attempt to avoid this, the 
NFLPA took out a $44 million insurance policy before negotiations began, which comes 
to roughly $200,000 per player for the year. 23  However even this was not enough for 
some players to meet their financial obligations and continue to live their preferred 
lifestyle.24  
While not a very complicated issue, the potential for players to miss game checks 
that would set them further back financially set a pseudo-time constraint on the players 
																																																								
22 Adam Stites, "NFLPA Is Warning Players to Start Saving Money Now for a 2021 
Lockout," SBNation.com, https://www.sbnation.com/2017/5/30/15712404/nflpa-cba-nfl-
lockout-2021-leverage-negotiations. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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that the owners were not concerned with. This has, however, impacted how the current 
crop of NFL players has prepared for the upcoming CBA negotiations. Veteran players 
that were a part of the last round of negotiations, as well as the NFLPA, have been 
warning younger players to begin saving years in advance for what could be another 
difficult set of negotiations for both parties.25 Without the ability to support themselves 
financially, the players would enter the negotiations at a disadvantage again, something 
the NFLPA is looking to avoid. 
Given the complicated nature of many of the issues tackled in a CBA, the above 
background section is fairly robust in its explanations of some of the minutia involved in 
past CBA negotiations. However, all of this context is crucial in understanding why the 
2011 CBA is the way that it is, the incentives for each party to engage in certain 
tradeoffs, and how these incentives will play into future CBA negotiations, specifically in 
2021. 
 
Section II - The Reality of the 2011 CBA: 
 Given the above context, it is clear that there were a lot of issues brewing below 
the surface that came to a head during the 2011 CBA negotiations. Moving on from 
internal squabbles in earlier negotiations, the owners united in their feeling that they were 
not getting their share of profits as compared to the players. After the owners opted-out of 
the 2006 CBA, it was clear that they were preparing for war, which the players did not 
recognize quickly enough to financially prepare. The players, in turn, focused more on 
their safety, as research continued to be released about the harmful effects of football on 
																																																								
25 Ibid. 
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the brain and the NFL dealt with continued lawsuits from former players suffering from 
the horrific physical and mental trauma of their playing years. Finally, Roger Goodell 
was participating in his first CBA negotiations as NFL Commissioner, and it appears as 
though he sought to begin his reign as a shrewd negotiator with a no-nonsense attitude, as 
he amassed never before seen punitive powers.  
The combination of these factors resulted in three major types of changes in the 
2011 CBA. These addressed financial concerns, as emphasized by the owners, player 
safety concerns, as emphasized by the players, and Commissioner powers, as sought by 
Goodell. All of the sides came in with different intentions, leading to a CBA with a very 
different flavor than its predecessors. Each of the areas of focus for the negotiating 
parties resulted in unintended consequences for everyone involved, ultimately completely 
altering the incentive structure for players and owners financially, as well as behaviorally. 
Furthermore, for each point of emphasis for the players, owners, and NFL, there was also 
a negotiating point that they were willing to lose ground on. Thus, there was a system of 
tradeoffs that could result in a mutually beneficial allocation, but the issue was in finding 
it. Unfortunately for the players, the system that was eventually agreed did not appear to 
be in their best interest. 
 
A) Financial Concerns: 
 While every aspect of the CBA is considered and painstakingly negotiated for or 
against by every party, each of the groups entered the negotiations with specific goals on 
how they wanted the 2011 CBA to be different from those previous. As discussed above, 
the 2006 CBA negotiations caught the NFL owners at a time when infighting and revenue 
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sharing between owners was a larger issue than revenue sharing between owners as a 
whole and players. When the owners recognized that they could have done better, they 
scrapped the deal and entered the 2011 CBA negotiations with a one-track mind. Thus, 
this section will focus on the financial considerations of the owners and players and how 
these impacted the resulting incentives of the 2011 CBA. This will be done through the 
exploration of two key items in the CBA, namely the salary cap/floor and changes in the 
rookie pay scale in conjunction with an increase to the veteran minimum salary. Both of 
these issues highlight areas where the owners sought to control the earning potential of 
players, and where the players were forced to consider trade-offs between monetary and 
other benefits. Here, players successfully obtained financial security through salary cap 
negotiations, but ultimately may have pushed veterans out of the league by cheapening 
rookie contracts and making veteran minimum contracts prohibitively large. 
 
1) The Salary Cap  
 The salary cap is often a contentious issue in CBA negotiations and is thus a great 
place to start an analysis. Given the history of the salary cap as described above and the 
rationale behind it, players have accepted its existence in the NFL landscape and the 
owners rely upon it in order to control the influence that players can wield within their 
teams. However, the size of the salary cap is where players and owners deviate. Previous 
CBA negotiations had changed the percentage of NFL revenues that were allocated to the 
salary cap, which was often used as a tradeoff by both players and owners to secure other 
benefits. Specifically, as mentioned above, the owners were unhappy with how the 2006 
CBA allocated the salary cap and was the primary driver behind their opt-out. Thus, the 
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salary cap was clearly a priority for the owners while it had taken a backseat for the 
players.  
 An added wrinkle in negotiations regarding the salary cap is what exactly the 
salary cap is a percentage of. While for a casual observer “NFL revenues” is a sufficient 
metric, but when one actually looks at the numbers that term leaves a significant amount 
of wiggle room. Clear revenue streams such as multi-billion dollar TV deals provide a 
significant floor, but ticket sales, merchandise sales, advertisement sales in different 
markets, sales from league stores, uniform endorsements, etc. each provide a unique 
challenge in their addition to the total. Furthermore, the owners often seek to exclude 
portions of NFL revenues from salary cap considerations. Currently, the NFL considers 
all streams of revenue when calculating the salary cap, while previously metrics such as 
gross revenue have been used.26 The result of the 2006 CBA negotiations was the players 
leaving with 59.6% of NFL revenues following a $1 billion credit to the NFL owners.27 
After renegotiation, in which players did receive increases to their pensions and 
acquisitions in player safety, the players left the 2011 CBA negotiations with between 
just 47-48% of all revenue, which was estimated at about 4% less than the previous 
agreement when the CBA was signed when considering the re-addition of the $1 billion 
that had previously been credited to the owners.28  
																																																								
26 Perritano, "How Does the NFL Salary Cap Work?." 
27 Gary Myers, "NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement Includes No Opt-Out, New 
Revenue Split, Salary Cap, Rookie Deals," Nydailynews.com, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/nfl-collective-bargaining-agreement-
includes-no-opt-out-new-revenue-split-salary-cap-rookie-deals-article-
1.162495?barcprox=true. 
28 Ibid. 
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To see what this numerically means, the salary cap in 2009 (2010 was uncapped) 
was $123 million, while the salary cap for 2011 was $120.3 million.29 In 2012, this 
increased by only $300,000 to $120.6 million, which made many players skeptical of the 
new CBA with respect to players’ earnings. Since then, a new TV deal has been signed 
and league revenues have continued to increase, which has in turn increased the salary 
cap by about $10 million per year. 30 This is a much higher rate than anyone had 
projected immediately following the CBA. Clearly Goodell validated the owners’ trust by 
continuing to increase league revenues despite global economic hardship and social 
pressure, while the players enjoyed increasingly large salary caps despite a decreased 
percentage of the total revenue, which they had used to gain ground in other areas of 
negotiation. A full breakdown of the NFL salary caps over the last 15 years is included in 
Appendix A. The salary caps listed are the league standard salary caps. Salary caps utilize 
a variety of roll over strategies to incentivize teams to spend freely, which causes each 
team’s yearly cap to slightly differ from one another. However, given that the focus of 
the analysis is on league trends, salary caps will be understood as the standard league 
salary cap. 
The last important bargaining issue in regards to salary caps is minimum 
spending. While the fans eyes might gravitate towards the big signings and high spending 
teams, players are most concerned with teams spending too little and hurting the demand 
for their services. Thus, one of the benefits players received from decreasing the 
percentage of league revenues allocated to the salary cap was in regards to the minimum 
																																																								
29 Gregg Rosenthal, "The CBA in a Nutshell," ProFootballTalk, 
https://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/25/the-cba-in-a-nutshell/. 
30 "Salary Cap Space," Over the Cap, https://overthecap.com/salary-cap-space. 
	 	 21	
	
spending of the salary cap.31 The minimum salary cap spending is calculated in two ways, 
minimum league-wide spending, and minimum team spending.32 This addresses the two 
main concerns that players had with spending by teams.  
Their first concern, that having only a minimum spending requirement per team 
would allow teams to create a lower salary cap in practice by depressing wages from 
within, is avoided with the league-wide minimum spending requirement. For the 2011-
2012 seasons, the league-wide minimum spending was set at 99% of the salary cap (99% 
of the league’s salary cap) over those 2 years.33 For the 2013-2016 seasons and 2017-
2020 seasons, the league wide minimum spending was set at 95% of the salary over each 
of those four-year spans independently.34 This gave the owners some leeway within a 
particular year to have relatively lower wages that may have been caused by an outside 
factor, but still holds them accountable for keeping players gainfully employed.  
Players also sought to avoid the issue of a single team with too small of a payroll, 
which is solved by minimum team spending rules. For 2011-2012 there were not 
minimum team spending rules given the 99% in league-wide spending.35 However, 
during the two four-year spans of 2013-2016 and 2017-2020 there was a minimum team 
spending requirement of 89% of their salary cap.36 This again allows teams to deviate in a 
given season if they are unable to attract the talent that they are looking for or are 
building with young players that are not highly paid, but still ensures that no team takes 																																																								
31 Rosenthal, "The CBA in a Nutshell." 
32 “NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement," 
https://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-agreement-2011-
2020.pdf, page 84. 
33 Ibid, page 84. 
34 Ibid, page 84. 
35 Ibid, page 84. 
36 Ibid, page 84. 
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advantage of its monopsony power over the employment of players to artificially 
depresses wages. 
The salary cap was put in place by the owners to serve as a check on the increase 
in leverage provided to players by free agency. In order to control the amount of bidding 
that could occur on individual players, the salary cap provides owners a reason to keep 
player wages relatively stable over time. Thus, while the salary cap does not benefit the 
players, it provides a counter balance to free agency that allows many players to 
financially prosper. Furthermore, the salary cap provides a negotiating platform for 
spending minimums, which are very beneficial to players. In the case of the salary cap, 
players have continued to have success in negotiations, securing a fair percentage of the 
total league revenues, while also enjoying the benefits of free agency in addition to 
league and team spending floors.  
The salary cap also provides room for negotiation with respect to other items, 
serving as an area that the NFLPA will often use as a negotiating strategy. During the 
2011 negotiations, players were able to secure benefits to their long-term health with the 
creation of a $1 billion fund, $620 million of which was used to create the Legacy 
Fund.37 The Legacy Fund is used for the pensions and health benefits for former players, 
a great tradeoff for a small percentage of the players’ share of league revenues. This was 
a successful gamble by the NFLPA, since league revenues have continued to increase 
over the life of the CBA, ensuring that player salaries continue to grow despite the 
smaller percentage of league revenues allocated to players. Therefore, players were able 
to secure the best of both worlds, with more money than ever going towards player 
																																																								
37 Rosenthal, "The CBA in a Nutshell." 
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salaries in addition to the existence of a well-endowed Legacy Fund, which benefits their 
long-term health and financial stability. While players may have secured a victory with 
respect to the salary cap, other successes in the 2011 negotiations appear to be few and 
far between. 
 
2) Rookie Pay Scale and Veteran Minimum 
 The Rookie Pay Scale was established in the 2011 CBA as a way to control 
outsized rookie contracts. While, over the history of the league, rookies have tended to be 
compensated lower than veterans, that gap began to narrow as football continued to gain 
national prominence. Furthermore, with college football’s increasing popularity, players 
began coming into the league with increasing levels of skill and popularity. Because of 
this, rookie contracts, when unregulated, reached levels that were unsustainable. This was 
especially true since, despite increased level of college competition, rookies still come 
into the NFL as an unknown commodity. Franchises were continually hamstrung by 
locking themselves into long, high paying contracts with rookies that did not always 
produce at a high level in the NFL. However, since rookies ultimately have the ability to 
not sign their contract until they are satisfied with the terms, and a team’s first round pick 
is so crucial to a team’s success, the deals continued getting larger. Veteran salaries were 
impacted as well because of the zero-sum nature of the salary cap. When rookies signed 
long-term outsized contracts, this left less money for veterans around the league, and left 
fewer teams with the flexibility to pursue them. These issues are permanently linked 
because of the finite resources of the salary cap, which is why players bargained for these 
issues with the other in mind.  
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 In 2009, the Detroit Lions spent $90 million on rookie contracts out of a salary 
cap of $123 million according to Forbes.38 This number might seem startlingly high, but 
after drafting in the top 5 for multiple years, players continue to seek higher paying 
contracts with no real limits on their negotiating ability. Upon the implementation of the 
rookie pay scale in 2011, Detroit’s spending on rookies decreased by two-thirds.39 Under 
the new system, rookies receive slotted contracts based on where they are drafted.  
Rookie contracts are locked in for three years, meaning that regardless of the 
circumstance they cannot renegotiate until after their third year for first round picks.40 
First round contracts are a total of four years, with a fifth year team option that they can 
choose to exercise, other drafted players have a four year contract, and undrafted players 
can sign a three year contract.41 These contracts are all predetermined based on a formula 
agreed to by the NFL and NFLPA, which is not public knowledge.42 The first year salary 
is determined by this formula, and it is up to the teams and the players to negotiate the 
terms of the following years within the restrictions supplied by the NFL, the most 
important being that a rookie’s salary cannot increase by more than 25% per year. This 
formula was created in order to control the total amount of the league wide salary cap that 
is allocated to rookie contracts.43 Veterans fought for this condition because they felt as 
though it was unfair to have rookies making some of the highest salaries in the league, 
with no controls on their total amount of guaranteed money while veterans were often 																																																								
38 David Lariviere, "NFL Rookie Contracts Show Owners Were The Winners In CBA," 
Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidlariviere/2012/07/04/nfl-rookie-contracts-
show-owners-were-the-winners-in-cba/#703ad9e852b. 
39 Ibid. 
40 “NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement," page 28. 
41 Ibid, page 24. 
42 Ibid, page 23. 
43 Ibid, page 23. 
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playing under contracts with much smaller guarantees that were usually shorter term.44 
Rookies drafted outside of the first round also have slotted salaries, with players drafted 
in the third through seventh round slotted between $400,000 and $500,000 and second 
round picks coming in between $1 million and $500,000, depending on where in each 
round they were drafted.45   
Veterans were able to make this trade-off in exchange for an increase in their own 
minimum salary. First, veterans secured their right to unrestricted free agency after four 
accrued seasons in the NFL, which was also the case during the 2006 CBA but was 
increased to six credited seasons during the uncapped year.46 Credited seasons are 
essentially the number of seasons active in the NFL and are not different enough to merit 
explanation. Appendix C contains the veteran minimum salaries for each year of the 2011 
CBA. Increasing the veteran minimum was a major priority for the NFLPA as they were 
negotiating, given the increased publicity and studies that have been done on the 
prevalence of CTE and other health issues with football players after their retirement, as 
well as while they are playing. There was specifically a priority placed on the 
compensation of older veterans, which is reflected in the values displayed in the 
minimum salary table. Some specific numbers worthy of note; in 2011, these minimums 
were $685,000 for players with 4-6 credited seasons, $810,000 for players with 7-9 
credited seasons, and $910,000 for players with 10+ credited seasons.47 This was largely 
																																																								
44 Lariviere, "NFL Rookie Contracts Show Owners Were The Winners In CBA." 
45 Volin, "NFL Owners Destroyed the Players in CBA Negotiations." 
46 Myers, "NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement Includes No Opt-Out, New Revenue 
Split, Salary Cap, Rookie Deals." 
47 “NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement," page 146. 
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viewed as a tradeoff specifically between veterans and rookies, however it introduced 
issues that might not have been fully considered during bargaining. 
The implementation of higher veteran minimums at the cost of the creation of a 
rookie pay scale brings to the forefront the issue of bargaining for future generations. 
Similar to the current attitude of older generations toward global warming, NFL players 
that had already experienced, and benefitted from, the lack of a rookie pay scale when 
they were on their rookie deals then implemented this slotted system on future 
generations. Since its implementation, players on their rookie deals have been speaking 
publicly about the many issues with the rookie pay scale, with many primarily focused on 
the issue of renegotiation being limited to after a player’s third credited season. At the 
time of the negotiations, veterans were disgruntled with the increasing size of rookie 
contracts and correspondingly decreasing size of their own contracts. These policies were 
meant to solve that issue, however some studies indicate that it may have instead created 
a new issue of larger veteran contracts, but for fewer players. Intuitively this might not 
immediately make sense, given that veterans were now mandated to make higher wages 
and rookies to make lower wages. However, what veterans failed to factor in was the 
impact of substitution.  
Rookies are very good substitutes for NFL veterans, and are typically younger 
and healthier making them preferable in some ways.48 The implementation of these two 
policies were meant to secure a larger piece of the salary cap for veterans, but may 
actually have resulted in many veterans being pushed out of the league because of 
prohibitively high salaries with respect to rookies. Forcing veteran contracts higher did 
																																																								
48 Volin, "NFL Owners Destroyed the Players in CBA Negotiations." 
	 	 27	
	
not actually benefit veterans that were already highly paid, and may have served to 
exclude veterans on the margins of rosters. Rookies, who could often fill these periphery 
roster spots at a similar level to veterans, make less than half of the veteran minimum for 
players in the 4-6 credited season range, and even less than players with more credited 
seasons.  
Rookies likely became a much more attractive alternative to general managers 
who were receiving essentially the same good for half the price, in addition to younger 
players having a decreased injury risk since they often have shorter injury histories. 
Teams could then spend more on their star players as they filled the rest of their roster out 
with young players that are often not on the team beyond their rookie contracts. Knowing 
this also would allow teams to utilize players on their first contracts in more dangerous 
plays such as on special teams and trick plays. These compromises were intended to not 
only increase veteran pay, but also to increase player safety by removing resources from 
the rookies and allocating more resources to pensions and insurance policies of veterans 
and former players. While the players were successful in increasing their pensions, the 
overall result of the policy was ambiguous at best. When one considers the incentives of 
the policy, it is evident that owners could take advantage of low rookie contracts and 
push veterans out of the game with little to no impact on the performance of the team. 
 As of yet, there is limited evidence and research regarding whether the 2011 CBA 
actually pushed veterans out of the league in favor of rookies. The little research that may 
resolve this issue comes from a study done by the Wall Street journal, and a related 
follow-up study by Pro Football Outsiders, a reputable and well respected football 
analysis website.  
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 The first iteration to consider is by The Wall Street Journal. The analysts at the 
Wall Street Journal looked at the Football Encyclopedia of Players found on Pro Football 
Reference with respect to the first and last year of each player’s career. They used this as 
the length of career for players and compared the average career length of players over 
time. The Wall Street Journal found a decrease in the average length of players’ careers 
from 2008-2015 from 4.99 years to 2.66 years.49  
Zach Binney, a writer for Football Outsiders, attempted to replicate this test, and 
was unable to achieve the same result. He pointed to a change in how Pro Football 
Reference tracked players, increasing the number of players that were able to be found in 
their index, which was tied to an increase in the number of players in the index that did 
not play any regular season snaps and thus had short careers.50 In order to correct for this 
error, Binney conducted the same study, but instead of using all of the players included in 
the Encyclopedia, he considered only those players that had played in at least one regular 
season game.51 By doing so, Binney used a more common standard of what it means to 
be an NFL player, and thus produced results that were more consistent with the football 
community’s perception. While Binney corrected for the flaws in the Wall Street 
Journal’s methodology, he may not have fully considered the outcomes of his study. 
In Binney’s iteration of the study, he found a career length of between 5.8 and 6.2 
years from 2007 to 2011, with that number dropping to 5.6 and 5.4 in 2012 and 2013 
																																																								
49 Zach Binney, "Are NFL Careers Really Getting Shorter?," Football Outsiders, 
https://www.footballoutsiders.com/stat-analysis/2016/are-nfl-careers-really-getting-
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50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
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respectively.52 Unfortunately this study was done just before the 2015 season, limiting its 
ability to aptly consider the impact of the 2011 CBA due to the limited amount of 
information during the current CBA. The career length of players before 2007 ranges 
from 5.1 to 5.5 from 2001 to 2006, so the 5.6 and 5.4 numbers may not necessarily be the 
beginning of a downwards trend.  
What Binney failed to consider, however, is that 2007-2011 constitutes the life of 
the 2006 CBA, which was widely acknowledged as better for the players. It is not 
inconsequential that the years before the 2006 CBA and after demonstrated a career 
length that was demonstrably different, if not very drastic. While it is impossible to 
conclude that player careers are decreasing since the implementation of the 2011 CBA 
with just the 2012 and 2013 results, it does still demonstrate that player’s careers are 
impacted by CBAs. It is also worth noting that most rookie contracts in the 2006 CBA 
were six year contracts, while the current contracts are four years with a fifth year option. 
It may be a coincidence that these are about the average length of careers for players 
during the time of those CBAs, but is worth recognizing nonetheless. 
These studies sought to determine if playing careers were shortening, and offered 
a few different potential explanations such as increasing injury awareness, an increasing 
number of players utilized by teams overall, or the new CBA.53 While these are all 
possible explanations for the shortening career of players, the injury issue seems as 
though it would incentivize a few players to retire early, but likely not influence teams or 
the majority of players that are seeking to maximize their earnings potential with little 
consideration for their long-term health. Furthermore, the increasing number of regular 																																																								
52 Ibid. 
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season players that Binney found, 1,895 in 2007 to 1,962 in 2015, supports the idea that 
there were more rookies in the league as they are more often dropped and added 
throughout the season due to the very small guaranteed financial commitment teams have 
the ability to make to rookies.54 Thus, the most likely explanation for the decreasing 
career length of players is the creation of the rookie pay scale. This is especially 
convincing since the observable trend begins right at the inception of the agreement. 
However, the other factors are still worthy of consideration and highlight the complex 
nature of the issue. 
This discussion of veteran minimums, rookie pay scales, and the salary cap/floor 
highlights the main financial takeaways from the 2011 CBA. Players clearly sought to 
guard their future paychecks and protect themselves from the owners. They utilized the 
salary cap floors on both a team and league wide basis to prevent teams from 
intentionally underpaying players and prevent collusion by the owners. The players 
leveraged their relative success in the previous negotiation to take a smaller overall 
percentage of league revenues in exchange for higher team and league minimum 
spending requirements. Just as the salary cap provides a protection for owners against 
quickly inflating player wages, the salary floor provides protection for the players against 
the monopsony power of the owners.  
The players then turned their focus to the minimum spend on veterans, which 
many felt was too low in relation to their rookie counterparts. However, given that only 
players in the league are represented at the negotiations, there were no defenders of the 
rookie contract. Thus, players were able to secure increased minimum salaries for 
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veterans at the cost of rookie salaries, which seemed to be a success. However, the 
players failed to anticipate how decreasing the cost of younger players could actually hurt 
the prospects of veterans. Given the increased veteran minimum and decreased rookie 
salaries, teams have become financially incentivized to fill roster spots with younger 
players, having the opposite effect from the players’ intentions. Perhaps including a 
representative for rookies in the 2021 CBA negotiation could help mitigate some of the 
issues that arise from the lack of perspective from rookies.  
 
B) Player Safety Concerns 
As medical research into the effects of football on the brain and body improve, 
current and former players continue to gain insight into how the game could be affecting 
them. While former players no longer have the ability to protect themselves from this 
harm, leading to lawsuits against the NFL with massive payouts, current players are able 
to better protect themselves by continuing to push for rule changes that make the game 
safer. This is best done through the CBA process, and player took full advantage of this 
in the 2011 negotiations. As mentioned above, players took a sizeable decrease in the 
percentage of league revenue that they had access to, partially for financial benefits, but 
some of the key substantive changes from the 2011 CBA were in player safety, both 
monetarily and in league-wide rule changes.  
Player safety has not always been the NFL’s priority, and many would argue that 
it still isn’t today, but in the years the 2011 CBA the NFL has made almost yearly rule 
changes in an attempt to decrease the violence of the game. While some believe that 
violence is inherent in football, it is clear that changes can be made to incentivize teams 
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and players to protect the participants of the sport and reduce injuries. Since 2011, rule 
changes such as moving the placement of the ball to the 25-yard line, rather than the 20, 
in the case of a touchback, increasing the emphasis on hits on defenseless players, 
personal fouls, and other especially violent hits by referees, and reducing overtime length 
have changed the incentives of some especially dangerous plays. By placing the ball on 
the 25-yard line rather than the 20 in the event of a touchback, the league provided an 
incentive for teams to return kicks less often, which is in one of the most dangerous plays 
in the sport.  
Given that only nine NFL teams averaged over 25 yards per kickoff the year 
before the rule was implemented, this is a fairly strong incentive for teams not to return 
most kicks.55 After considering that most kickoffs are caught inside the end zone, 
necessitating the returner gain 25 yards plus however deep he was in the end zone in 
order to reach the 25-yard line, it becomes even less reasonable for teams to attempt to 
return a kick in anything other than perfect circumstances. Furthermore, conservative 
coaches can point to the scoring likelihood difference and choose to play the numbers, 
where in the season before the implementation of the rule, touchdowns were scored on 
20.8% of drives starting on the 25-yard line as compared to 17.9% of the drives starting 
on the 20-yard line.56 This serves the purpose of both making the game more exciting to 
fans looking to watch high-power offenses, and safer for the players. However, changes 
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like this do also fundamentally change the game and devalue a set of players, which some 
coaches and players have resisted. Clearly there is still more work to be done by the NFL, 
but these rule changes make it easier for supporters of the league to point to positive 
progress. The above rule changes were spurred by conversations around player safety that 
occurred during the 2011 negotiations, and are a great way to put these changes in 
context. 
One focus in the negotiations was in making preseason activities safer for players 
as they began to ease back into playing shape. In previous iterations of the CBA, players 
were often subjected to training camps meant to quickly transition them from non-playing 
shape into playing shape. However, players often complained of an uptick in injuries as a 
result of this rapid shift from a relaxed lifestyle to an immediate highly active lifestyle. 
These practices had very little limits on their length, the number per day, or the amount of 
contact allowed. In the 2011 CBA, players hoped that by further regulating these 
preseason practices, it would help to limit the number of injuries that occur before the 
season. Therefore, the 2011 CBA implemented a system where, as reported by the New 
York Daily News, the “first day of training camp limited to physicals and meetings; 
second and third day no pads or contact; only one padded practice per day, limited to 
three hours; second practice can only be a walkthrough”.57 This, players hoped, would 
allow them to ease into training by limiting their activity in the first few days of camp, 
and having only one practice per day.  
Another attempt to make the game safer was through the creation of a rule 
limiting the number of padded practices allowed by the NFL. The CBA states that, 																																																								
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“during the regular season, padded practices for all players shall be limited to a total of 
fourteen, eleven of which must be held during the first eleven weeks of the regular 
season, and three of which must be held during the remaining six weeks of the regular 
season”.58 This attempted to solve a similar issue to the limits placed on preseason 
practices, since players often found themselves entering games while exhausted from the 
week of practice. By limiting the contact in practice, players were able to limit the toll 
that repeated activity has on their body, in addition to reducing the number of hits that 
they take, especially in the head. Limiting the physical reps of players has also had the 
effect of emphasizing the cerebral nature of the game, pushing more practice time 
towards watching game film to identify the weaknesses of opponents and on play design. 
The goal of this policy was certainly noble, but many coaches argue that some of the 
declining technique observed in current players in positions such as along the offensive 
line can be attributed to this reduction in “real-time” reps for young players. This decline 
in play, along with the reported injury numbers since the 2011 CBA, have led many to 
question the efficacy of these rule change for their intended purpose. 
A recently published study by Zachary Binney and other researchers at the Emory 
University Schools of Public Health and School of Medicine, goes in depth on the 
number of injuries suffered by players since the CBA and whether those were 
conditioning or non-conditioning injuries.59 This helps to contextualize how the above 
player safety changes may have impacted players’ conditioning, and thus potentially 
caused more injuries than it prevented.  																																																								
58 “NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement," page 143. 
59 Zachary Binney, Kyle Hammond, Mitchel Klein, Michael Goodman, and Cecile 
Janssens. NFL Injuries Before and After the 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement. 
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Binney et al examined how conditioning related injuries changed over time, 
where they defined conditioning injuries to be those identified by “an orthopedics and 
sports medicine physician with extensive experience as an NFL team physician” 
according to the study.60 By reducing practice and conditioning time in preseason and the 
regular season, players may have put themselves at increased risk for conditioning 
injuries. Binney and his colleagues observed conditioning-related injuries increasing 
between 2007 and 2011 from 197 to 271.61 This is an incredibly large jump, but can be at 
least partially attributed to the 2011 offseason being shortened by the bargaining process. 
Since players were unsure if they would be playing that season, and since training camp 
was cut short because of bargaining, players did not have as much time to physically 
prepare as they may have wanted. Thus, the 2011 season was likely an aberration, but 
trends from the rest of the CBA can be observed.  
For the rest of the CBA, the researchers observed a rate of 220-240 conditioning-
related injuries since (in years 2012-2017), which is significantly higher than the 2007 
level but also significantly lower than the 2011 level. Binney utilized a Poisson model to 
estimate how conditioning-related injury occurrences may have been impacted by the 
CBA, and ultimately found that the CBA caused an immediate 5% increase in 
conditioning-related injuries in the post-2011 CBA NFL.62 They also observed that in the 
pre-2011 CBA NFL, conditioning related injuries were increasing, while in the post-2011 
CBA NFL the rate was consistent.63  
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After looking more into the data of the study, the idea that the rate of the 
occurrence of conditioning-related injuries was increasing before 2011 seems to rely on 
an increase in 2010, which I would contend should be removed from consideration for 
similar reasons to 2011. While the preseason in 2010 did not suffer the same shrinking as 
in 2011, the differences in free agency based on accrued season and the fact that there 
was no salary cap caused confusion for many players. By removing 2010 and 2011 from 
consideration, the trend is much clearer, with slight increases before 2010 but a 
significant jump following the implementation of the 2011 CBA. This indicates that, 
while the CBA may have been intended to keep players safer, it might have actually put 
players in harms way by effectively underpreparing them for the season. 
The intentions of the 2011 CBA were, in earnest, to make the game safer. Owners 
could lose their revenue streams, coaches could lose their jobs, and players could lose 
their lives if football is not made safer and more sustainable. However, as is often the 
case, the intended results of the policies in the 2011 CBA and the actual results are 
significantly different. While players may have sought to protect themselves by limiting 
the number of hits they were taking in practice, it may have actually increased their 
likelihood of injuries in games. Similarly, while players may have sought to ease into the 
preseason more effectively, they may have put themselves at an increased risk of 
conditioning-related injuries but limiting the amount of time that they spent getting into 
football shape. Coaches often point to the 2011 CBA as limiting their time with players 
and thus their ability to improve them via coaching, but the biggest issue with the more 
limited practice rules might actually be the injuries caused by the resulting under-
preparation of players. 
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C) Commissioner Powers 
 Given that that the NFLPA was fighting so hard for benefits in other areas, it 
appears as though the negotiators did not fully consider the impact of the augmented 
powers provided to Roger Goodell. This has ultimately been the largest, and most 
consistent, point of contention between the league and the players and is the reason that 
the upcoming negotiations are shaping up to be as intense, if not more, than those that 
occurred in 2011. Many players supported increasing accountability when the first 
personal conduct policy was implemented, but as Goodell began to wield his powers to 
their fullest extent, opinions quickly changed. 
 In reflecting on the important take-aways from the CBA, very few articles form 
2011 mention Goodell’s increased discretion with respect to discipline, which is an 
interesting window into how priorities can change. Since then, the NFL has come under 
increased scrutiny for actions taken by players such as Ray Rice, Adrian Peterson, and 
Ezekiel Elliot, all of whom were accused of domestic violence, among other players 
accused of others. Many believe that Roger Goodell has acted as judge, jury, and 
executioner in these situations to the increasing consternation of the players, which has 
created a very combative relationship between them and the Commissioner. Due to the 
fact that, as mentioned above, NFL discipline does not require a ruling by the justice 
system, many players felt as though the rulings passed down by Goodell were overly 
harsh, unsubstantiated, or both. While the public tended to land on the opposite side of 
most issues, which put Goodell in a difficult position, players have become increasingly 
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fed-up with what they see as Goodell acting out of spite and having an undue impact on 
the outcome of games and teams’ successes.64 
 In 2014, the NFL was embroiled in a public relations crisis due to Peterson and 
Rice, both of whom were accused of domestic violence with just a few months. A video 
emerged in February 2014 of Rice striking his then fiancée, which led to criminal charges 
and a conviction, but after agreeing to undergo court-supervised and marrying his 
girlfriend in March, the charges were dropped.65 Rice was suspended for only the first 
two games of the season for the incident, which caused a public outcry. However, once 
additional footage was released in September of Rice punching his fiancée in the face 
during the incident, Rice was cut by the Ravens and suspended indefinitely by the league, 
which he eventually appealed and got overturned. However, the negative press associated 
with Rice and his declining skillset ultimately ended his career following this incident.  
In a similar situation to Rice, Adrian Peterson was accused of abusing his child in 
early September of 2014, as pictures surfaced of his son’s legs with injuries from being 
hit with a stick.66 He pleaded no contest in court and was sentenced to community service 
by the justice system, but the NFL waited until November to rule, when they suspended 
Peterson for the remainder of the season without pay. Since then, Peterson has continued 
																																																								
64 Bob Condotta, "Seahawk Richard Sherman Rips Roger Goodell, Officiating, Says NFL 
'Isn't Fun Anymore'," The Seattle Times, 
https://www.seattletimes.com/sports/seahawks/seahawk-richard-sherman-rips-roger-
goodell-officiating-says-nfl-isnt-fun-anymore-and-more/. 
 
65 Jamison Hensley, "Ray Rice Suspended 2 Games," ESPN, 
http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/11257692. 
66 Steve DiMatteo, "Timeline of the Peterson Child Abuse Case," SBNation.com, 
https://www.sbnation.com/2014/9/17/6334793/adrian-peterson-child-abuse-statement-
vikings-timeline. 
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in the league as the issue has generally left the public’s consciousness and he has 
continued to play at a high level. Before his suspension, Peterson was placed on the 
Commissioner’s Exempt list, which prevented Peterson from playing but did not 
correspond with any sort of verdict issued by the league or the justice system.  
Both of these incidents highlight the increased accountability that resulted from 
Goodell’s power, but where players began to diverge was through the use of tools such as 
the Commissioners Exempt list. Players worried that, if the Commissioner had the power 
to remove players from games before there has been a complete investigation, disgruntled 
ex-partners or family members may seek to take advantage of this. Furthermore, many 
players were upset with the fact that the consequences for Rice and Peterson were 
comparable to a first offense for smoking marijuana, and were much less severe than 
punishments experienced by a player such as Martavis Bryant for violating the marijuana 
policy multiple times. Bryant was first suspended 4 games for violating the leagues 
policy on marijuana (2 games more than Rice’s initial suspension), and following his 
second offense he was suspended for a full season. These punishments were based on an 
agreed upon system of consequences, however the relative punishments caused 
consternation among players, especially considering that a third violation of the 
marijuana policy results in an indefinite suspension. 
 Goodell made his biggest mistake when he sought to discipline Tom Brady and 
the New England Patriots for what was thought to be tampering with the game balls used 
in the AFC Divisional and Championship playoff rounds. When officials tested the air 
pressure in the balls at halftime, some were outside of the acceptable inflation range. This 
was enough to convince the league that the Patriots had intentionally deflated the balls in 
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order to gain a competitive advantage. Goodell then suspended Brady for 4 games, fined 
the team 1 million dollars, and took two draft picks from the team. Brady, the Patriots, 
and the Players Union fought this ruling by pointing to The Ideal Gas Law, which 
indicates that the level of deflation observed by game officials was natural given the 
conditions of the game. Despite the fact that this is scientifically proven and 
corroborated, Goodell continued his pursuit of Brady, which led to back and forth battles 
in court and multiple rounds of appeals over the course of the entire 2015 season. 
Ultimately, Brady served his 4 game suspension a full year later than it was originally 
intended, which he turned into a Super Bowl winning season. The lack of oversight on 
Goodell enraged players and the NFLPA alike, causing many to swear that Goodell 
would not maintain his power into the next CBA. 
By prioritizing player safety and earnings, the NFLPA did not fully consider how 
Goodell’s discretion over league discipline might impact the players on a personal level. 
They also failed to recognize how Goodell’s discretion might impact their ability to make 
political statements, like the National Anthem Protests that gripped the nation last season. 
While the policy introduced at the beginning of the league year banning kneeling on the 
field during the anthem has since been rescinded, it a constant reminder of the growing 
divide between the players and the league. This might incentivize players to fight more 
for the ability to have a say in the disciplinary process, which would deeply complicate 
the upcoming negotiations. Players will likely need to trade some of the gains that they 
have made in other areas in order to decrease Goodell’s discretion, which will almost 
certainly cause debate among the players over how to prioritize other issues. Regardless 
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of how the upcoming negotiations shake out, players must remain united in order to 
address their concern with Goodell’s powers and bargain for their best outcome. 
 
Section III - Conclusion: 
Clearly CBA negotiations are incredibly complex and often have unanticipated 
results. From players being pushed out of the league because of prohibitively high self-
imposed salaries to players being at a higher risk of injury due to decreasing practice 
time, the policies sought by many players in this round of negotiations may have been 
more harmful than beneficial. As my argument presented, the 2011 CBA as a whole may 
not have put in place the best policies for the players. While team owners and the league 
likely did not fully anticipate the outcomes of these policies either, players were the ones 
that were most hurt by these failures.  
Financially, players prioritized the salary floor and veteran minimums, which 
resulted in a mixed bag of successes and distinct failures. Additionally, players sought to 
make the game safer, securing funds for retired players and their families, increasing 
benefits, and reducing practice time in an attempt to limit the physical toll on their 
bodies. However, this may have actually caused them to be underprepared for the season, 
potentially increasing conditioning related injuries. Finally, the NFLPA allowed the 
league to implement new personal conduct standards under the supervision of League 
Commissioner Roger Goodell, which has proven to be wildly unpopular with players. 
This failure to anticipate the real effects of policy has caused many players to unite and 
seek an agreement with a completely different set of incentives.  
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For the upcoming 2021 CBA negotiation, there has already been quite a bit of 
discussion around the relevant issues. Current president of the NFLPA, DeMaurice 
Smith, has specifically mentioned addressing commissioner powers, injury occurrence on 
Thursday Night Football, and increased benefits for former players, among others.67 
Little is likely to be done to address the incentive issue caused by the rookie pay scale 
and high veteran minimums, as there is still no medium for the advocating for future 
rookies, and the veterans taking part in the negotiations are still a part of the league. The 
salary cap/floor is always an issue that is renegotiated in each CBA, but will likely 
remain in a similar position. Injuries are always on the mind of players and, with 
increasing pressure of the NFL to protect its players, there will likely be a combined 
effort between the players and the league to augment the current system to address 
injuries. The league has already taken some steps to address this with the addition of 
doctors not affiliated with a team performing the concussion evaluations for players in 
games. Based on conversations around the league, players will be putting a high priority 
on decreasing the amount of power wielded by Commissioner Goodell with respect to 
player discipline. As the negotiation date draws closer, players are preparing for a lockout 
the likes of which has not been seen by the NFL in decades, and could shape the future of 
the league, if the players successfully anticipate the true results of their actions. 
 
 
 
																																																								
67 Kevin Seifert, "DeMaurice Smith: NFLPA Will Approach 2021 Talks Like 'War'," 
http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/22291292/demaurice-smith-nflpa-approach-2021-
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Appendix 
A 
Year Salary Cap (numbers in millions) 
2018 $177.2 
2017 $167 
2016 $155.3 
2015 $143.3 
2014 $133 
2013 $123 
2012 $120.6 
2011 $120.3 
2010 Uncapped 
2009 $123 
2008 $116 
2007 $109 
2006 (start of the 2006 CBA) $102  
2005 $85.5 
2004 $80.6 
 
Adapted from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salary_cap#cite_note-nfl.com-19 
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Appendix B 
 
 
"NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement," page 146.	
